University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

12-2-1952

In re Caravas' Estate
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, In re Caravas' Estate 40 Cal.2d 33 (1952).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/479

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

REPORTS OF CASES
DETERlIIINED IN

THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF CALI FORNIA
[40 C.2d 33; 250 P.2d 593]

[Sac. No. 6166.

In Bank.

Dec. 2, 1952.]

Estute of GERASIMOS CARA¥AS, Deceased. SHELDON
BRANDENBURGER, as Administrator, etc., Appellant,
v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
[1] Alienage-Inheritance-Rights of Nonresident Alien.-When
a nonresident alien succeeds to property, title vests in him
at the death of decedent, subject to control of the probate
"court and to possession of the personal representative for
purposes of administration. (Prob. Code, § 300.)
[2] Id. - Inheritance - Time Within Which Property Must be
Claimed.-If a nonresident alien should appear and demand
property within five years of his succession thereto, his right
to the property is absolute; if he fails to meet that requirement, his right to the property is disposed of as escheated
property. (Prob. Code, § 1026.)
[3] Decedents' Estates-Decree of Distribution-Distribution to
State.-Under Probe Code, § 1027, estate assets not distributed
by the final decree to known heirs, devisees or legatees entitled
thereto, are distributed to the state and are held by the State
Treasurer.

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Alienage and Citizenship, § 15; Am.Jur.,~"
Aliens, § 42 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] "Alienage, § 28; [2, 14] Alienage,
§ 33; [3] Decedents' Estates, § 1042.5; [4] Alienage, § 34; [5-7,
11, 12, 15] Escheat, § 7; [8] War, § 8; [9, 10] Liniitation of Actions, §§ 109, 113; [13] Limitation of Actions, § 113; [16] Limitation of Actions, § 116.5.
( 33 )
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[4] Alienage-Inheritance-Effect of Failure to Olaim Property.
--If an alien succeeding to property has not made a "deIlumd" therefor under Proh. Code, § 1026, .at the time of the
decree of distribution, the Stute Treasurer takes possession
of the property.
[5] Escheat-Claims to Escheated Property.-When property is
held by the State Treasurer under Prob. Code, § 1027, claimants must appear and claim the estate or any part thereof
in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, and if the
claim is not filed within the statutory period it "shall be
forever barred," and such property shall vest absolutely in
the state.
[6] Id.-Claims to Escheated Property-Time to File Claim., Since the sentence of Prob. Code, § 1027, preceding the statement that "Rights of nonresident aliens shall be governed
by the provisions of Section 1026," provides that the five-year
period for filing a claim under § 1027 commences from the
date of the decree making distribution to the State Treasurer,
the purpose of the reference to § 1026 is to call attention
to the fact that when nonresident aliens succeed to the
property, the five-year period is computed from the "time
of succesHion" rather than from the date of distribution.

[7] Id. - Claims to Escheated Property. - When Prob. Code,
§§ 1026, 1027, are read together, it is clear that after the
State Treasurer takes possession of assets of an estate pursuant to § 1027, a "demand" by a nonresident alien under
§ 1026 must be made in the Superior Court of Sacramento
County in the same manner that a "claim" would be made
for other assets held by the State Treasurer under § 1027,
the only difference between the two classes of property being
that in the case of a nonresident alien the five-year period
for making the claim is computed in a different manner.
[8] War-Alien Enemies-Maintaining Actions.-A citizen and
resident of Greece during the period when the United States
was at war with Germany came within Trading With the
Enemy Act as a resident of an enemy-occupied country (50
U.S.C. Appendix, § 2), and hence was unable to maintain
a proceeding in a California court for the recovery of her
property to which she was entitled as an heir.

)

[8] Right of resident alien who is a subject of an enemy country to prosecute suit during war, notes, 3 A.L.R. 341; 140 A.L.R.
1518; 141 A.L.R. 1512; 142 A.L.R. 1505; 143 A.L.R. 1517; 144
A.L.R. 1507; 145 A.L.R. 1471; 146 A.L.R. 1470; 147 A.L.R. 1303;
148 A.L.R. 1384; 149 A.L.R. 1453; 150 A.L.R. 1418. See, also,
OaI.Jur., § 5; Am.Jur., War, § 69 et seq. .
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[9] Limitation of Actions-Suspension of Statute-War-Statutory Prohibition.-A "disability" under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 354, excluding from period limited for commencement of
an action the time during which a person is under a disability to commence an action by reason of existence of a
state of war, and a "statutory prohibition" under Code Civ.
Proc., § 356, excluding from period limited for commencement of an action the time when commencement of action
is stayed by statutory prohibition, are present when Trading With the Enemy Act prevented administrator of estate
of nonresident enemy alien from filing a claim to property
in California.
[10] Id.-Suspension of Statute-War-Statutory Prohibition.The word "action" in Code Civ. Pro c., §§ 354, 356, excluding from period limited for commencement of an action the
time during which commencement of action is prevented by
existence of a state of war or is stayed by a statutory prohibition, includes a "special proceeding of a civil nature." (Code
Civ. Proc., § 363.)
•
[11] Escheat-Claims to Escheated Property-Procedure Applicable.-When a claim to an estate distributed to the State
Treasurer is filed in the Superior Court of Sacramento County
pursuant to Prob. Code, §§ 1026, 1027, the applicable procedure is that outlined in Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1272, 1272a,
relating to claims to escheated property, which are in part
IIlof the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled "Special Proceedings of a Civil Nature."
[12] Id.-Claims to Escheated Property-Statute of Limitations.
-The act of filing a claim in the Superior Court of Sacramento County under Prob. Code, §§1026, 1027, to an estate
distributed to the State Treasurer is the "commencement of
an action" within Code Civ. Pro c., §§ 354, 356, excluding
from period limited for commencement of an action the time
during which commencement of action is prevented by existence of a state of war or is stayed by a statutory prohibition.
[13] Limitation of Actions - Suspension of Statute - War. - A
statute of limitation is tolled during the period when the
existence of a state of war prevents access to the courts,

[13] War suspending running of limitations in absence of .
specific statutory provision to that effect, notes, 137 A.L.R. 1454;
140 A.L.R. 1517; 141 A.L.R. 1511; 142 A.L.R. 150R; 143 A.L.R.
1519; 144 A.L.R. 1508; 145 A.L.R. 1473; 146 A.L.R. 1472; 147
A.L.R. 1311; 148 A.L.R. 1386; 149 A.L.R. 1457; 150 A.L.R. 1419,
See, also, Oal.Jur., Limitations of Actions, § 160; Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 2~3 et seq.

)

I====~)

36

B:-;'l'A'l'E U(·' CAHAV A:-;

[40 C.2d

whether or not the particular statute of limitation expressly
provides for such suspension thereof.
[14] Alienage-Inheritance-Time Within Which Property Must
be Claimed.-At least after a decree distributing an estate
to the state has been entered under Prob. Code, § 1027, the
right of a nonresident alien claiming the estate by succession
is dependent on commencement of a legal proceeding within
the five-year statutory period. '
[15] Escheat-Claims to Escheated Property-Statute of Limitations.-In proceeding by administrator of estate of nonresident alien heir to recover property distributed to the state
pursuant to Prob. Code, § 1027, it is error to include the
period between the date of distribution to the state and the
date of termination of German occupation of Greece, in which
country the heir lived and died, in computation of the fiveyear period specified in Prob. Code, § 1026.
[16] Limitation of Actions - Suspension of Statute - Effect. When the operation of a statute of limitation is suspended
for a given length of time, the effect is to add an equal period
to the statutory period.
i

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County denying petition of administrator of estate
of nonresident alien heir to recover property distributed to
State Treasurer pursuant to Prob. Code, § 1027. John Quincy
Brown, Judge. Reversed.
Brandenburger & White and William A. White for Appellant.
Harold I. Baynton, Assistant Attorney General, }i'rank J.
Hennessy, United States Attorney, George B. Searls and
Joseph Laufer, Attorneys, Department of Justice and Myron
D. Alexander, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and 'Villiam J.
Power, Dt'pnty Attorney Gt'Heral, for Respondent.

,

i

,

!

i,
i

:

,

f!
,
,

I
I

f t
1
&

i

!

f1
i

,

'I
i

!
H

.j

'l'IL\ YNOH, .J.-Gerasimos Caravas died intestate in San
Francisco Oil September ao, 1~)41, and his estate was probated
in the Supel'ior (101I1·t of the City and County of San Franeisco. No IIt'it·s appear('d to dailll tht' ('state and on September
1;', 1~42, the court eutered its <it'cree ordering distribution
of the estate to the State 1'reasurer pursuant to section 1027
of the Probate Code. ] 11 fad, however, Gerasimos was sur-
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viwd by his motlier, }<'oteini CarHVH:-i, H resident Hnd eitizf'll
of Greeee Hnd his solp hpir llnder sedion 22!1 of OlP Probatp
Code. Poteiui dipd ill UI'('PI'P ill 1944. On Allg-m;t 25, ]!)47,
petitioner, administrator of Foteilli '8 estate, filed a petition
in the Superior Court of Saeralllento County praying that
the State 'freasurer be ordered to pay to petitioner the funds
of the estate, amounting to $1,936.18. In explanation of the delay ill filing the claim petitioner alleged, and the trial court
found, that Greece was occupied by German military forces
from April 7, 1941, to November 30, 1944, and that during
this period it was impossible to file a claim for the funds held
by the State Treasurer. The trial court also found that the
reciprocity necessary under section 259 of the Probate Code
existed. 'fhe court, however, entered judgment denying the
claim, on the ground that it was barred by section 1026 of
the Probate Code, providing: "A nonresident alien who becomes entitled to property by succession must appear and demand the property within five years from the time of succession; otherwise, his rights are barred and the property shall
be disposed of as escheated property." Petitioner appeals
from the judgment, contending that his claim was timely
made on the ground that the period of German occupation
of Greece should not have been included in the computation
of the five-year period prescribed by section 1026.
[1]
'Vhen a nonresident alien succeeds to property, title·
vests in him at the death of the decedent (Estate of Romat'is,
191 Cal. 740, 744 [218 P. 421]), subject to the control of the
probate court and to the possession of the personal representative for purposes of administration. (Prob. Code, § 300.)
[2] If the nonresident alien should "appear and demand"
the property within five years of his succession thereto, his
right to the property is absolute; if he fails to meet that requirement, his right to the property is barred and the property is disposed of as escheated property. (Lyons v. State,
67 Cal. 380, 384 [7 P. 763] ; Estate of Meyer, 107 Cal.App.2d
799, 804 [238 P.2d 597].) Section 1026 does not expressly
provide how the alien must make his "demand," but the
applicable procedure is found in other statutes. [3] Under
section 1027 of the Probate Code, estate assets not distributed
by the final decree to known heirs, devisees, or legatees entitled
thereto, are distributed to the State of California and are
held by the State Treasurer. [4] Thus, if as in the present
case an alien has not made a "demand" under section 1026 at
the time of the decree of distribution, the State Treasurer

I~--
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takt's poss('ssioll o/" til(' P1'oIH'rt.\'. [5] \Vhen property is held
undpl' s!'diqll 1O~7, elailltallts mllst appeal' and claim the estate
01' any part thereof jilt hl' Superior Court of Sacramento
COllnty, If the (')aim j:s Jlot filed within the statutory period,
jt "shall be forever barred, and such property, or so much
thereof as is not claimed shall vest absolutely in the State."
Section 1027 further provides that "Hights of nonresident
aliens shall be governed by the provisions of Section 1026."
[6] Since the sentence of section 1027 preceding the quoted
reference to :section 1026, provides that the five-year period
under section 1027 commences from the date of the decree
making distribution to the State Treasurer, the purpose of
the reference to section 1026 is to call attention to the fact
that when nonresident aliens succeed to the property, the
five-year period is computed froUl the "time of succession"
rather than from the date of distribution. [7] When sections 1026 and 1027 are read together, it is clear that after
the State 'l'reasurer takes possession of assets of an estate pursuant to section 1027, a "demand" by a nonresident alien
under section 1026 must be made in the Superior Court of
Sacramento County in the same manner that a "claim" would
be made for other assets held by the State Treasurer under
:section 1027, and that, after the distribution to the State
'rreasurer, the only difference between the two classes of property is that in the case of a nonresident alien the five-year
period for making the claim is computed in a different manner. 'l'he attorney general contends that a "demand" under
section 1026 may be made without any court action by the
nonresident alien, even after the property has been distributed
to the State 'l'reasurer', relying upon a dictum in State v.
Smith, 70 Cal. 153, 156 [12 P. 121]. In that case, however,
the court was not concerned with express statutory language
that after distribution to the State Treasurer a claim to the
property could be made only in the Superior Court of SacrallIento County.
The determinative question on this appeal is whether the
five-year period set forth in section 1026 should be extended
bpcanse of the disability suffered by petitioner,
[8] In the prc:sent case the nonresident alien was a citizen
and resilIent of Greece during the period when the United
States was at war with Germany. As a resident of an enemyoccupied country she came within the provisions of section
two of the Trading 'Vith the Enemy Act. (50 U.S.C.A.
Appendix, § 2; Drewry v. Onassis, 266 App.Div, 292 [42
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N.Y.S.2d 74, 78], affirmed without opinion, 291 N.Y. 779
[53 N.E.2d 243] ; The Rita Maersk, 52 F.Supp. 56, 59, affirmed,
]44 F.2d 921; Compagnie Francaise De L'Afrique Occidentale
v. The Otko, 57 F.Supp. 829; 148 A.L.R. 1423.) She was thus
unable to maintain a proceeding in a California court for
the recovery of her property. (Trading With the Enemy Act,
§ 7; E.r parte Colonna, 314 U.S. 510, 511 [62 8.Ct. 373, 86
L.Ed. 379] j Mder v. Schml:dt, 150 Neb. 647, 648 [35 N.W.2d
500] ; 137 A.L.R. 1355.) Moreover, section 3 of the Trading
With the Enemy Act prohibited residents of Greece from
communicating with anyone in this country "except in the
regular course of the mail " and during the German occupation
mail service with Greece was suspended. (Postal Bulletin
No. 18344, Nov. 28, 1941; Postal Bulletin No. 18773, Nov. 21,
1944.) It thus was impossible for Foteini Caravas or her heirs
in Greece to communicate with persons in this country, or to
file an action in a California court if communication could be
had.
Petitioner contends that proceedings under sections 1026
and 1027 are subject to sections 354 1 and 356 2 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. This contention must be sustained.
[9] A" disability" under section 354 and a "statutory prohibition" under section 356 are both present since the Trading With the Enemy Act prevented petitioner from filing a
claim to the property. [10] The word" action" in sections
354 and 356 includes a "special proceeding of a civil nature."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 363.) [11] 'Vhen a claim is filed in
the Superior Court of Sacramento County pursuant to sections 1026 and 1027, the applicable procedure is that outlined
in section 1272 and 1272a of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Ebert v. State, 33 Ca1.2d 502, 509 [202 P.2d 1022]; see
amendment to § 1027 by Stats. 1951, ch. 1459, § 1), and those
sections are in part III of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled "Special Proceeding'S of a Civil Nature." [12] It is
thus clear that the act of filing a claim in the Superior Court
of Sacramento County under sections 1026 and' 1027 is the
l"When a person is, by reason of the existence of a state of war;
under a disability to commence an action, the time of the continuance
of such disability is not part of the period limited for the commencement of the action whether such cause of action shall have accrued
prior to or during the period of such disability."
·"When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or
statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction
or prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement
of the action."

40
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"eommencement of an action" within sections 354 and 356.
(Taketa v. State Board of Equalization, 104 Cal.App.2d 455,
459 [231 P.2d 873] [mandate to set aside order revoking
liquor license] ; People v. Grant, 52 Cal.App.2d 794, 800 [127
P.2d 19] [proceeding under Pen. Code, § 325 to forfeit money
taken from slot machines] ; lVells v. California Tomato Juice,
Inc., 47 Cal.App.2d 634, 6:17 [118 P.2d 916] [proceeding to
(·nforc·e mechanic's lien].)
[13] Moreover, although sections 1026, 1027, 1272 and
1272a <10 not expressly refer to snspension of the limitation
prriod when war has prevented access to the Superior Court
of Sacramento County to file a claim, it is an established
pJ'illeiple of international and municipal law that a statute
of limitation is tolled during the period when the existence
of a state of war prevents access to the courts, whether or not
the particular statute of limitation expressly provides for
sueh suspension thereof. (Kolund.iija v. Hanna Ore Mining
Co., 155 Minn. 176, 179 [193 N.W. 163]; Wirtele v. Grand
Lodge, A.O.U. W., 111 Neb. 302, 305 f196 N.W. 510] ; Siplyak
v. Davis, 276 Pa. 49, 52 [119 A. 7451 ; Inland Steel Co. v.
Jelenovic, 84 Ind.App. 373, 376 [150 N.E. 391] ; 54 C.J.S.,
IJimitation of Actions, § 259; 137 A.L.R. 1454.) "All statutes of limitation are based on the assumption that one
with a good cause of action will not delay bringing it for
an unreasonable length of time; but, when a plaintiff has been
denied access to the courts, the basis of the assumption becomes destroyed." (Frabutt v. New York, Chicago &- St. Louis
R. Co., 84 F.Supp. 460, 466.) A typical case is Hanger v.
Abbott, 6 'Vall. (U.S.) fi!32 [18 L.Ed. 939}. There, shortly
after the CiviJ 'Var a resident of New Hampshire brought
an action in the federal court in Arkansas against a resident
of Arkansas. The debt sued upon had been contracted before
fhp. war and the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations.
Thp. COllrt held that since the COUl'ts of Arkansas were closed
to a citizen of New Hampshire during the war, the statute
of limitation was suspended for that period. The court
l't'l'ol!ui1.<'ll that the applieable statute of limitation did not
I'xprt'ssly rl,fl'r to war disabilities but held that nevertheles.~
it must be interpreted to include such exception. Again. in
Pdt'I'''' \'. J/dl/l.'l, 19;; Ot·t'. -tl:! 1:!:IH P.2tl 22;;, :!4H P.2d 58fiL
a l~aSt' appusitt, to tlit' pt'l'Sl'lIt Ullt', Ull Orel!on statute provided
that aftt'l' property escht.'ated to the state, it could be claimed
within 10 years thereof. rrhe statute did not provide for extension of the 10-year period if war prevented filing of a claim.
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Hrsidents of The Netherlands filed a claim after expiration
of tlw statutory period, alleging- as an eXCIlS(l for the delay
that the occnpation of rrh(l Netherlanos by (iermany prrventeo timcly compliancf' with the st.atute. The claimants'
right was ultimately o(lnied on grounds inapplicable here, but
the Oregon court held that the period during which the claimants were denied access to the Oregon courts by reason of the
war could not be included in the computation of the 10-year
period. The court stated: "vVhen the state consents to be
SHed, and then by reason of its recognition of rules of interIlatiollal and common law, closes its courts to the litigant,
thereby Jellying the privilege which is granted, some construction must be sought which will avoid absurdity. It is unbelievable that the same hand which gives should also be const.rued to take away." (238 P.2d at 236.)
The attorney general contends that the foregoing cases
should not be followed here, on the ground that section 1026
is a substantive statute of limitation and that at the expiration of five years the nonresident alien not only lost his remedy
under sections 1272 and 1272a, but that in addition the right
itself was extinguished under section 1026. As previously
pointed out, under section 1026 title vests in a nonresident
alien at the death of the decedent, subject to the condition that
he must" appear and demand" the property within five years
to prevent loss of his title. If he does not so appear his right
to the property is lost; if he does appear his right is preserved. [14] Thus, at least after a decree of distribution
to the state has been entered under section 1027, the right of
a nonresident alien is dependent upon the commencement of
a legal proceeding within the five-year period, just as the re('overy of an ordinary party plaintiff may be dependent upon
the commencement of appropriate legal proceedings within
t he time specified by a statute of limitation. A contention
similar to that made here by the attorney general was rejected in State of Maryland v. United States, 165 F.2d 869,
873, where the court stated: "And we think that it makes no
difference that the limitation applicable to the action for
death by wrongful act is held under state law to be a con- .
Jition on the exercise of the right rather than a limitation on
the remedy. This holding is based upon the narrow ground
that the limitation-is imposed by the statute creating the cause
of action and is, to say the best of it, technical and legalistic
reasoning, which is not followed in all the states." The same
conclusion was reached in Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.

=
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~d 767, 769, whpre a merchant seaman was unable to file an
action within the time specified by a substantive statute of
limitation because he was interned by th~ Japanese government and denied access to the courts during the time when the
action should have been filed. (Accord: Scarborough, v. At.
lantic Coast Line R. Co., 178 F.2d 253, 259, certiorari denied,
:J39 U.S. 919 [70 S.Ct. 621, 94 L.Ed. 1343] ; Siplyak v. Davis,
supra, 276 Pa. 49, 58; see, also, l!'arrell v. Oounty of Placer,
~3 Ca1.2d 624, 630 (145 P.2d 570, 153 A.L.R. 323].) Clearly,
whether a particular statute of limitation is viewed as sub·
stantive or procedural, the consequences of a failure to com·
mence legal proceedings within the specified time are the same
insofar as the claimant is concerned and, accordingly, the same
considerations that lead to the conclusion that a procedural
statute is tolled by the fact that the claimant is denied access
to the courts similarly lead to the conclusion that the time
specified in a substantive statute of limitation must likewise
be extended.
[15] For the foregoing reasons, we have concluded that
the trial court erroneously included the period between September 15, 1942, the date of distribution to the state, and
November 30, 1944, the date of termination of German occu·
pation of Greece, in its computation of the five-year period
specified in section 1026. It is unnecessary to determine
whether, as contended by petitioner, the period between the
death of Gerasimos and the decree of distribution, or any part
thereof, should also have been excluded. The periods between
the death of Jecedellt, September 30, 1941, and the decree of
distribution, September 15, 1942, and between the date that
occupation ended, November :JO, 1944, and the date that the
claim was filed, August 25, 1947, total less than five years.
[16] When the operation of a statute of limitation is suspended for a given length of time, the effect is to add an
e4lLai period to the statutory period (Graybar Electric 00. v.
iJov'inger, 81 Cal.App.2d 936, 938 [185 P.2d 370]), and,
under the views expressed herein, petitioner thus filed a claim
within the five-year period prescribed by section 1026.
The judgment is reversed.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
.T., and Spence, .T., concurred.

